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Abstract 
This article addresses some potential limitations of key findings from recent research into 
inequalities in children’s social services by providing additional evidence from multilevel 
models that suggest the socioeconomic social gradient and ‘Inverse Intervention Law’ in 
children’s services interventions are statistically significant after controlling for possible 
confounding spatial and population effects. Multilevel negative binomial regression models 
are presented using English child welfare data to predict the following intervention rates at 
lower super output area-level: Child in Need (n = 2707, middle super output area [MSOA] n 
= 543, local authority [LA] n = 13); Child Protection Plan (n = 4115, MSOA n = 837, LA n = 18); 
and Children Looked After (n = 4115, MSOA n = 837, LA n = 18). We find strong evidence 
supporting the existence of a steep socioeconomic social gradient in child welfare 
interventions. Furthermore, we find certain local authority contexts exacerbate this social 
gradient. Contexts of low overall deprivation and high income inequality are associated with 
greater socioeconomic inequalities in neighbourhood intervention rates. The relationship 
between neighbourhood deprivation and children looked after rates is almost five times 
stronger in local authorities with these characteristics than it is in local authorities with high 
overall deprivation and low income inequality. We argue that social policy responses 
addressing structural determinants of child welfare inequalities are needed, and that 
strategies to reduce the numbers of children taken into care must address underlying 
poverty and income inequality at both a local and national level. 
 
Keywords: social work, child protection, deprivation, income inequality, children’s social 
care 
 




 Multilevel models were used to reanalyse child welfare inequalities data 
 Robust quantitative evidence for the ‘inverse intervention law’ and social gradient 
 Findings are consistent, after controlling for confounding spatial and demographic 
factors 
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 The finding of an ‘income inequality intervention law’ mirrors international research 
on other social problems and on population health 
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Abstract 
This article addresses some potential limitations of key findings from recent research into 
inequalities in children’s social services by providing additional evidence from multilevel 
models that suggest the socioeconomic social gradient and ‘Inverse Intervention Law’ in 
children’s services interventions are statistically significant after controlling for possible 
confounding spatial and population effects. Multilevel negative binomial regression models 
are presented using English child welfare data to predict the following intervention rates at 
lower super output area-level: Child in Need (n = 2707, middle super output area [MSOA] n 
= 543, local authority [LA] n = 13); Child Protection Plan (n = 4115, MSOA n = 837, LA n = 18); 
and Children Looked After (n = 4115, MSOA n = 837, LA n = 18). We find strong evidence 
supporting the existence of a steep socioeconomic social gradient in child welfare 
interventions. Furthermore, we find certain local authority contexts exacerbate this social 
gradient. Contexts of low overall deprivation and high income inequality are associated with 
greater socioeconomic inequalities in neighbourhood intervention rates. The relationship 
between neighbourhood deprivation and children looked after rates is almost five times 
stronger in local authorities with these characteristics than it is in local authorities with high 
overall deprivation and low income inequality. We argue that social policy responses 
addressing structural determinants of child welfare inequalities are needed, and that 
strategies to reduce the numbers of children taken into care must address underlying 




Literature concerned with the relationship between family socio-economic status (SES), 
local contexts and social work interventions has continued to grow internationally in recent 
years (see, for example, Slack, et al., 2017; McAuley & Rose, 2019). In England, variations in 
children’s chances of receiving a child protection intervention have been linked to socially 
structured inequalities (Bywaters, et al., 2014a; 2015). Pilot research using an inequalities 
lens led to a much wider project across the four United Kingdom countries which better 
evidenced the existence of both a strong social gradient in social work interventions and an 
‘inverse intervention law’ in England (Bywaters, et al., 2014a; 2014b; 2015; 2018a; 2018b; 
Morris, et al., 2018).  
 
The inverse intervention law refers to the finding that when comparing children living in 
neighbourhoods with equivalent levels of deprivation, a child in a less deprived local 
authority (larger geographical municipality) is more likely to experience a child protection 
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intervention than a child in a more deprived local authority (ibid).1 This is hypothesised to 
have resulted from differential levels of local authority (LA) expenditure relative to need, 
with less financially constrained, low deprivation LAs intervening more frequently in 
equivalent neighbourhoods as high cost interventions are rationed a little less stringently 
(Hood, et al., 2016). The findings of this research programme have been used in the 
development of new models for social work with families (Featherstone, et al., 2018) and 
the study has been replicated internationally, such as in Aotearoa New Zealand by Keddell, 
et al. (2019). Given this impact, the robustness of the study’s main findings warrants further 
examination.  
 
To date the evidence for these phenomena has come from descriptive data analyses that 
have not controlled for potential confounding factors. Arguments can be made that these 
SES-based child welfare inequalities may actually be artefacts of other relationships 
between other demographic characteristics and interventions that are well-documented in 
social work literature. Some of these competing explanations have been particularly absent 
in quantitative social work research. Narratives that reference spatial concentrations of 
child abuse and neglect are common among social workers (Morris, et al. 2018) but 
quantitative spatial analysis of child abuse and neglect is sparse, although there has been 
some research of this type in the US (Hillier, 2007). Building the strength of the 
socioeconomic inequalities argument in relation to child welfare intervention requires that 
these competing explanations are properly accounted for and, to the extent that the data 
allow, we address these here by presenting the findings of a complex model that controls 
for neighbourhood demographics and spatial autocorrelation.  
 
We present some justification for the confounding factors we include in our analysis in a 
brief literature review below. We focus on six potential confounding factors that appear in 
the literature, all being covariates with poverty. These are: place, ethnicity, unemployment, 
infant mortality, income inequality, and population education. As an example, poverty is 
heavily geographically concentrated (Kavanagh, et al., 2016), and, as noted, previous 
research has highlighted that social workers often reflect heavily on locales themselves and 
less on their shared underlying characteristics like deprivation level (Morris, et al. 2018). 
Therefore, it may be reasonable to suggest that socioeconomic child welfare intervention 
inequalities actually reflect spatial closeness of children at risk, not an association between 
poverty and child protection. Even if this is unlikely, failure to address this weakness in our 
quantitative analysis means we cannot truly know whether socioeconomic evidence is 
robust. The effects need to be ‘disentangled’.  
 
Such confounding factors did not feature in the initial analysis of child welfare inequalities 
(e.g. Bywaters, et al., 2014a; 2018a; 2018b) as the quality of data precluded this. To some 
extent, the quality of data still obscures a full analysis of the chances of intervention for 
individual children. The main obstacle is that in the UK information is collected routinely on 
children in the child protection systems but no data – either demographic or socio-
economic – is collected about parental or family circumstances. We therefore are limited to 
presenting a neighbourhood-level analysis by linking child protection data with lower super 
                                                     
1 The name ‘inverse intervention law’ comes from a concept in health inequalities literature, the ‘inverse care 
law’ (Tudor Hart, 1971). We maintain this nomenclature to draw explicit parallels to health inequalities. 
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output area (LSOA) level data on deprivation using UK IMD scores. These scores capture 
relative income and employment deprivation as well as deprivation in the form of access to 
key services. 
 
A primary contribution of this paper is in the addition of spatial autocorrelation and the 
parameterisation of the inverse intervention law as a cross-level interaction between local 
authority level deprivation and lower super output area deprivation, allowing the scale of 
the inverse intervention law to be quantified and for other types of contextual ‘laws’ to be 
tested. This allows us to answer whether the ‘inverse intervention law’ that has been 
identified in more descriptive work carries statistical significance and whether the 
relationship between income inequality and child welfare interventions mirrors similar 
relationships in public health literature. We argue that if contextual effects are large in scale 
policy responses at the local level only will have limited success in alleviating child welfare 
inequalities.  
 
Literature Review  
Child welfare inequalities are defined as occurring ‘when children and/or their parents face 
unequal chances, experiences or outcomes of involvement with child welfare services that 
are systematically associated with structural social dis/advantage and are unjust and 
avoidable’ (Bywaters et al., 2015: 100). Inequity can be seen, for example, in differences in 
the chances of children being taken into care depending on their ethnic heritage or their 
family’s socioeconomic characteristics (Bywaters, et al., 2018a; 2019). Within these 
inequities are recurrent patterns of association between levels of socioeconomic status and 
child welfare intervention rates. This relationship is referred to throughout as the ‘social 
gradient’ in child welfare intervention (ibid). Further, the same research into child welfare 
inequalities found that this social gradient differs substantially depending on the levels of 
deprivation in the larger geographical area: there are greater inequalities in intervention 
rates between poorer and more affluent neighbourhoods when the overall level of 
deprivation in the wider administrative area is lower.  
 
The first potential confusion to be disentangled refers to the spatial proximity of children 
subject to child protection interventions and the feasible argument that such interventions 
may be spatially concentrated, perhaps as a result of territorial stigma associated with 
certain neighbourhoods and communities that is often, but may not necessarily, be 
associated with deprivation (Hillier, 2007; Cummins, 2016; Wacquant, 2009; Wacquant, et 
al., 2014). Another spatially located issue is that of community assets in preventing child 
neglect and abuse, and the differential perceptions of communities held by social workers 
and residents (McDonell, et al., 2015; Maguire-Jack and Font, 2016; 2017; Maguire-Jack and 
Showalter, 2016; Gross-Manos, et al., 2018). As McDonell et al. (2015) summarise, there is 
some evidence that the care and support of children is improved where there are: good 
social networks and social engagement across families, schools and community institutions; 
higher perceived social cohesion; stronger social capital; and more involvement of 
neighbours. Such spatial clustering of low and high community assets may be entangled 
with deprivation and intervention.  
 
Secondly, there is the well-documented if not necessarily well understood relationship 
between ethnicity and child welfare interventions (Barn, 2007; Bernard & Gupta, 2008; 
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Owen & Statham, 2009; Bywaters, et al., 2014b, 2017, 2019). Different ethnic groups often 
have divergent intervention rates with many Black, Asian, and Minority Ethic (BAME) groups 
being disproportionately represented in the child protection system. In England the social 
gradient appears to differ substantially between ethnic groups, with some minority ethnic 
groups experiencing higher rates of intervention in low deprivation areas but lower rates of 
intervention in high deprivation areas, relative to the White British child population 
(Bywaters, et al. 2019). Most BAME populations are also disproportionately at risk of 
poverty (Platt, 2007). As socioeconomic status, neighbourhood deprivation and ethnicity are 
so closely related we might expect a reasonable degree of confoundment. Furthermore, 
there is the issue of high levels of segregation between and within ethnic groups in England 
and Wales (Catney, 2017), a spatial factor that further undermines confidence in any 
socioeconomic social gradient argument without sufficient controls. It is difficult to say 
without a complex model whether deprivation-based child protection inequalities are 
simply reflections of wider ethnic inequalities or whether the two operate independently.  
 
Parental education has emerged as a ubiquitous protective factor in programmes designed 
to reduce the incidence of child neglect and abuse, with strong evidence that low levels of 
both paternal and maternal education levels are associated with increased risks of child 
maltreatment (Sidebotham & Golding, 2001; Mulder, et al., 2018). However, many of these 
studies have historically neglected to incorporate structural factors such as poverty into 
their analysis (Metzler et al, 2017). Unsurprisingly, lower educational attainment is 
associated with lower income and a higher risk of poverty (Pantazis, et al., 2006). Therefore, 
it is not unreasonable to suggest that the social gradient may otherwise be reflecting the 
relationship between parental education and risk of child maltreatment and subsequent 
child welfare interventions, partcularly where parents with higher education backgrounds 
may be more comfortable navigating the child protection system. Effective policy 
recommendations are likely to be profoundly different if, in actuality, population education 
levels were a stronger predictor of social work interventions than deprivation. 
 
Lastly, evidence by Eckenrode, et al. (2014) identified a relationship between income 
inequality and child maltreatment. This mirrors broader patterns of association between 
inequality and social problems that have been at the centre of public health debate for at 
least a decade (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015; Uphoff & Pickett, 2018). Such a potential 
relationship has been of growing interest for understanding child welfare inequalities, 
where an increasing focus on seeing intervention through a social inequalities lens has been 
identified as a key priority for new research (Nichols, 2015; Featherstone, et al., 2018). 
Economic inequality has become demonstrably associated with a multitude of social 
problems, it is therefore important to assess whether the relationship between social 
problems and income inequality extends to child welfare interventions in a complex 
analysis.   
 
Data & Method 
This section outlines the methods and data used to answer the following research 
questions:  
1. Is the social gradient identified in previous descriptive research statistically 
significant after controlling for possible confounding factors? 
2. How strong is the ‘inverse intervention law’, and is it statistically significant? 
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3. Is local authority income inequality associated with significantly steeper social 
gradients in child welfare intervention? 
 
This paper uses data from the Child Welfare Inequalities Project (Bywaters, et al., 2017b) 
linked to additional administrative data. Data sets included: 
- Children’s services data for all children assessed as ‘in need’ of services, including 
details about their age, gender, ethnicity, and whether they were subject to either 
child protection plan or looked after (in State care) interventions, at 31st March 
2015, linked to the LSOA code of their family home, or the home address from which 
they entered care.  
- LSOA-level data including 2015 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score and 
estimates of child population size and ethnic density (2011 Census adjusted for 
LSOA-level population growth). IMD consists of several domains of deprivation, 
weighted as follows: income deprivation (22.5%); employment deprivation (22.5%); 
education, skills and training deprivation (13.5%); health deprivation and disability 
(13.5%); crime (9.3%); barriers to housing and services (9.3%); living environment 
deprivation (9.3%) (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2016).  
- Local Authority level data including estimates of infant mortality from the Office for 
National Statistics, a five year average of Job Seeker’s Allowance claimant rate from 
the Department of Education’s Local Authority Interactive Tool (2013-2018), the 
proportion of the population with Level 4 or higher education qualifications (roughly 
equivalent to a foundation degree or above) from the 2011 Census, and estimates of 
income inequality before housing costs estimated from summary data of household 
income from CACI Limited’s Paycheck data set (2019), as used in previous research 
on inequality (Fone et al. 2013).  
 
‘Child in need’ status refers to children who have been identified as in need by their local 
authority under the statutory definition outlined in the Children’s Act 1989 (S.17). Children 
are ‘in need’ if they are unlikely to ‘achieve or maintain, or have the opportunity of 
achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the 
provision for them of services by a local authority’; or, ‘their health or development is likely 
to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, without the provision for them of such 
services’; or, if they are living with a disability (Department for Education, 2018: 5). The 
status of ‘in need’ is required in order to access certain kinds of help that may be welcomed 
by some families, though not all, as the category can also indicate professional concern 
about how a child is being cared for. 
 
A child protection plan status reflects a step-up in intervention where a local authority has 
identified that a child is suffering abuse or neglect, or is at significant risk of harm and 
suffering, and is now working with the family to resolve this risk. Children looked after (CLA) 
status refers to children who are under the care of the state. Most have been separated 
from their birth families following child protection concerns and are living with foster 
parents or in an institutional setting. Some children are placed with extended family. 
Children who have been adopted or are on Special Guardianship Orders (longer-term 
kinship care) are not counted as ‘children looked after’ in official statistics. Of these three 
child welfare categories, child protection plans and children being looked after statuses 
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usually involve considerably more involuntary arrangements than are found for a child 
involved with Children’s Social Services because they are ‘in need’. 
 
Overall, the data covered 52,179 Children in Need; 6,716 children on child protection plans, 
and 8,865 children looked after within 4115 LSOAs with each LSOA consisting of between 
around 470 and 1000 households. This figure equates to approximately 12 per cent of the 
total population of children on protection plans or looked after in England. Thirteen local 
authorities (8 per cent of all LAs) with adequate data on Children in Need were used in the 
CIN model and eighteen local authorities (12 per cent of all LAs) were used in the analysis of 
Child Protection Plan and Children Looked After rates. The reason for this discrepancy is that 
in the original Child Welfare Inequalities Project study only thirteen of the local authorities 
provided full, accurate data on children in need. The eighteen local authorities from the 
Child Welfare Inequalities Project were chosen using a stratified sampling frame, ensuring 
local authorities were selected from all regions in England with a range of levels of 
deprivation, population, geographical size and administrative structure. Nonetheless, the 
possible lack of representativeness of Children in Need data for the five local authorities 
excluded from the CIN analysis should be kept in mind when considering the findings, as we 
can be less confident of their generalisability. 
 
Summary statistics for all variables included in the models are shown in table one. Income 
inequality estimates were based on 1,000 bootstraps of a simulation algorithm that 
extrapolates income distributions from detailed summary statistics of household income in 
bands of £5,000, iteratively adjusted for skew at the positive tail of income distributions. 
Gini coefficients  - a commonly-used measure of inequality (De Maio, 2007) - were then 
calculated based on these simulated income distributions. The coefficients derived from this 
method were consistent with other attempts to estimate local-level income inequality in 
England (Bradshaw & Bloor, 2016).  
 
Because of high correlations between the proportions of some ethnic minority groups living 
in LSOAs the initial number of ethnic categories (11) was reduced to five: Mixed Heritage, 
Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian Indian, Black British/African/Caribbean/Other. 
Population counts for different Mixed Heritage ethnic groups were combined, as were Black 
African, Black Caribbean, and Black Other population counts, due to their LSOA ethnic 
densities having correlations higher than r = 0.85. Ethnic density for different Asian groups 
were left disaggregated as correlations were not high enough to result in serious 
multicollinearity concerns (r < 0.6).  
 
The analysis used multilevel spatial regression models to predict child welfare intervention 
rates within LSOAs. The choice of count model was informed by comparing relative model 
fit information criterion (AIC/BIC), and is explained in the results below. Dependent 
variables were the number of Children in Need (CIN), Children on Child Protection Plans 
(CPP), and Children Looked After (CLA) in each LSOA. An offset variable of the log of the 
child population divided by 10,000 was included to control for population size and to aid 
interpretation by standardising the output of predictions as the number of child welfare 
interventions per 10,000 child population, a commonly used denominator for children’s 
services figures (Hilbe, 2012). All LSOA-level variables were centred and standardised 
around their local authority means and standard deviations to aid interpretation of effects 
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and better separate effects at the local authority and LSOA level (Bell, et al., 2018). Local 
Authority level variables were grand mean centred and standardised.  
 
We control for spatial correlation between LSOAs by including a matrix of spatially 
correlated random effects based on Euclidean distance between population weighted 
centroids for each LSOA, where spatial correlations fit a negative exponential distribution (a 
hypothesised exponential decay in the strength of the correlation in intervention rates as 
the distance between pairs of LSOAs increases) (Corrado & Fingleton, 2011; Kristensen, 
2019). Population weighted centroid distances are used as opposed to shared borders as 
LSOA borders are usually not used in relation to service delivery nor are populations usually 
dispersed evenly throughout them. Moran’s I statistics were calculated from residuals for 
models without spatial error terms to identify evidence of spatial autocorrelation 
(Fotheringham & Rogerson, 2008).  
 
Multilevel models allow researchers to estimate and control for autocorrelation within 
grouping or clustering factors in data and provide corrected estimates for higher-level 
variables with lower sample sizes, both of which violate assumptions of general linear 
regression (Robson & Pevalin, 2015). In this instance it is necessary because lower super 
output areas are nested within middle layer super output areas (MSOAs), which are, in turn, 
nested within local authorities (LAs). LSOAs within the same local authority are also more 
likely to be similar to one another than LSOAs in different local authorities, especially 
considering different local authorities may use different social work practice models. 
Random intercepts were included at the MSOA and LA level. 
 
Random effects can also be added under the assumption that there is normally distributed 
variance in the coefficients for lower-level variables depending on the higher-level group 
membership (Robson and Pevalin, 2005). The inverse intervention law is one such example 
of a lower-level effect that differs depending on group membership – neighbourhood 
deprivation has a stronger relationship with child welfare interventions in some local 
authorities than it has in others. Considering the emerging literature and unanswered 
questions concerning differential intervention for ethnic groups (Bywaters, et al., 2019), we 
also control for the eventuality that ethnic density may have differential effects in each local 
authority, and include this as a random effect. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics and ranges for variables  
     
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
LSOA Number of Children in Need  10.60 11.20 0.00 89.00 
LSOA Number of Children on Child Protection Plans 1.53 2.71 0.00 28.00 
LSOA Number of Children Looked After 1.97 3.18 0.00 46.00 
LSOA IMD Score 21.9 15.80 1.18 82.60 
LA IMD Score 22.0 8.14 8.86 41.20 
LSOA Mixed Heritage % 2.21 2.09 0.00 14.90 
LSOA Asian Indian % 3.42 7.74 0.00 71.50 
LSOA Asian Pakistani % 1.32 3.64 0.00 53.60 
LSOA Asian Bangladeshi % 0.53 1.68 0.00 35.70 
LSOA Black African/Caribbean/Other % 3.27 6.65 0.00 57.20 
LA JSA 5 Year Average % 1.65 0.92 0.72 4.14 
LA Infant mortality per 1,000 3.57 1.28 1.20 6.70 
LA Level 4 Qualification % 27.40 7.35 15.2 50.30 
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LA Gini coefficient 0.386 0.014 0.358 0.415 
     
 
 
Interpretation of Results: One Standard Deviation Changes in Deprivation 
While the Indices of Multiple Deprivation are used extensively in UK research and policy 
they can be difficult for an international audience to interpret without some explanation. 
IMD scores are only interpretable in a relative sense, where higher scores indicate greater 
levels of deprivation and lower scores indicate lower levels of deprivation, relative to other 
neighbourhoods. Although lower IMD score neighbourhoods are sometimes referred to as 
more affluent, this is not exclusively the case as IMD does not measure affluence, only the 
presence or absence of deprivation. It is assumed that a lack of deprivation is often 
associated with an increase in affluence. Strictly speaking, however, we should state that 
any references to affluence really relate to the absence of deprivation.  
 
It can be difficult to meaningfully interpret the reality that changes in IMD scores represent 
because they are a composite of several measures. As outlined above, IMD scores in 2015 
were based on seven indicators of deprivation. While the majority of these indicators have 
scores that are only meaningful in a relative sense, the two domains with the greatest 
weighting, income deprivation and employment deprivation, are expressed as a proportion 
of the population experiencing that domain of deprivation and have more straightforward 
explanations. The expected proportion of an LSOA population experiencing income and 
employment deprivation for different levels on our standardised LSOA IMD Score variable 
are presented in Table 2, to give readers a sense of the reality of a one-unit change in 
standardised IMD score for a neighbourhood. 
 
Income deprivation refers to the proportion of the population that were in receipt of 
income-related welfare support including income based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and 
those receiving Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). It also includes adults and 
children in receipt of Child Tax Credit or Working Tax Credit whose income falls below 60 
per cent of the median income for England – the relative poverty line (Smith, et al. 2015). In 
a statistically ‘average’ LSOA, with a standardised LSOA IMD score of 0, we would expect 
around 14.5 per cent of the population to be in income deprivation. In a more deprived 
LSOA, with an IMD score one standard deviation higher than the average, we would expect 
almost a quarter of the population to be living in income deprivation. By contrast, in a less 
deprived LSOA with an IMD score one standard deviation lower than the average, we would 
expect less than one-twentieth of the population to be living in income deprivation. 
 
Table 2: Expected proportion of people in income and employment deprivation for standardised changes in 
overall IMD Score 
 Standardised LSOA IMD Score 






Per cent of people in income deprivation   4.6 14.5 24.5 
Per cent of people in employment deprivation 4.6 11.9 19.2 
     
 
We see similar figures when comparing the expected proportion of the population living in 
employment deprivation at different levels of the overall multiple deprivation score. 
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Employment deprivation is calculated based on the proportion of the population claiming 
welfare benefits related to employment, including Jobseeker’s Allowance, Employment and 
Support Allowance, Incapacity Benefit, and Carer’s Allowance (Smith, et al. 2015). We would 
expect around one-fifth of the population in high-deprivation LSOAs to be claiming one or 
more of these benefits, but less than one-twentieth in the low-deprivation LSOAs. The 
expected rate for an LSOA with an average IMD score is around 12 per cent.  
 
The range between negative one and positive one on a standardised scale includes 
approximately 68 per cent of cases. This means that the majority of our neighbourhoods will 
have scores within this range, with minus one and plus one standard deviation operating as 
a reasonable approximation of an average ‘low score’ and ‘high score’ on the scale. 
Approximately 95 per cent of cases lie between the range of minus two and plus two 
standard deviations, enabling comparisons between neighbourhoods at the extreme ends of 
the spectrum of deprivation. Readers should keep this in mind when interpreting the 
findings below – in short, a change of one standard deviation in the IMD score of an LSOA 
reflects quite a large difference in the relative privations of the population. LSOAs and LAs 
with scores one standard deviation below the mean would be approximately at the mid-
point of the third least deprived LAs/LSOAs, and those with scores one standard deviation 
above the mean would be at approximately the mid-point of the third most deprived. 
 
Results 
We first consider decisions related to statistical model choice and justifications for a 
multilevel spatial model structure before describing the substantive models for each 
intervention. As well as the inverse intervention law, the analysis considers the ‘income 
inequality intervention law’, a hypothesized phenomenon where the strength of the social 
gradient in child welfare interventions is contingent on the level of income inequality in a 
local authority. The amount of variance in local authority intervention rates and social 
gradients that can be explained by the inverse intervention law and income inequality 
intervention law is shown in the online appendices, which includes tables showing models 
with increasing complexity for each of the intervention measures. The comparison of these 
models shows the size of the suppression effect between the two intervention laws. 
 
Choice of model distribution family and random intercepts 
Alkaike and Bayes’s Information Criterion statistics (AIC and BIC) were used to assess the 
most appropriate from a family of probability distributions for generalised linear models 
(Vrieze, 2012), and then to assess the significance of the inclusion of random intercepts at 
the MSOA and LA level. These are presented in table 2. The first stage of selecting the most 
appropriate general linear model involves determining whether a negative binomial model 
fits the distribution of the dependent variable better than a Poisson model. If so, the 
following step involves assessing which negative binomial dispersion parameter better fits 
the data, one where variance increases quadratically versus one where it increases linearly 
(Hardin & Hilbe, 2007). Decreases in the AIC and BIC values indicate an improvement in 




Table 2: Relative Model Fit for determining model distribution family and multilevel random intercepts 
 CIN Model CPP Model CLA Model 
Distribution AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Poisson 30072.9 30078.8 18000.7 18007.0 
 
19793.9 19800.3 
Negative binomial 2 𝜎2 =  𝜇 (1 + 𝜇𝜑 ) 17772.9 17784.7 12825.3 12838.0 14858.1 14870.7 
Negative binomial 1 𝜎2 =  𝜇(1 +  𝜑) 
 
17800.5 17812.3 12775.2 12787.9 14837.2 14849.9 
    
Selection: Negative binomial 2 Negative binomial 1 
 
Negative binomial 1 
 
       
Random effects AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
MSOA only 17175.1 17192.8 12511.9 12530.9 14452.8 14471.8 
MSOA & LA 17099.4 17123.0 12476.7 12502.0 14393.6 14418.9 
       
Spatial correlation Moran’s I p-value Moran’s I p-value Moran’s I p-value 
Null model  0.127 <0.001 0.037 <0.001 0.056 <0.001 
Model with covariates 0.057 <0.001 0.015 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 
       
Selection: MSOA & LA Random 
Intercepts. 
Indication of spatial 
dependence. 
 
MSOA & LA Random 
Intercepts. 
Indication of spatial 
dependence. 
 
MSOA & LA Random 
Intercepts. 
Indication of spatial 
dependence. 
 
       
 
Negative binomial models far outperformed Poisson models for predicting rates of 
intervention, with a dispersion parameter of variance increasing quadratically with the 
mean in the CIN model fitting best but a linear relationship fitting slightly better for the CPP 
and CLA models (CIN AIC = -12,300, BIC = -12,294.1; CPP AIC = -5,225.5, BIC = -5,219.1; 
CLA AIC = -4,956.7, BIC = -4,950.4). Inspection of model fit for the inclusion of random 
intercepts implies that there are non-trivial clustering effects within MSOAs and Local 
Authorities, and that a multilevel model is preferable. 
 
Moran’s I statistics were calculated for testing spatial autocorrelation amongst residuals in 
the multilevel models with MSOA- and LA-level random effects and then for models 
containing all covariates. A statistically significant Moran’s I value greater than zero 
indicates spatial clustering, whereas a value less than zero indicates spatial dispersion; a 
value of zero indicates spatial randomness. The findings suggest that there is statistically 
significant spatial clustering in the multilevel models, and that a spatial model to control for 
spatial patterns in intervention rates is necessary. However, the size of the spatial 
correlation after including the covariates in the model is very small for CPP, and almost 
negligible for CLA. As they were still significant the spatial correlation matrix was retained, 
but the very low spatial correlation in the CLA model meant that the parameters for 
exponential decay could not be calculated. Spatial correlation summaries are provided in 
the online appendix table A4 and parameters for the extracted exponential decay function 
are included in table 3.  
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Table 3: Multilevel Negative Binomial Models predicting Intervention rates per 10,000 Children (standardised independent variables)   
 Children in Need Child Protection Plans Children Looked After 
LSOA Level B Exp(B) SE p B Exp(B) SE p B Exp(B) SE p 
LSOA IMD Score 0.4392 1.551 0.0251 *** 0.5542 1.741 0.0247 *** 0.5293 1.698 0.0289 *** 
Mixed Heritage % 0.0276 1.028 0.0212  0.0723 1.075 0.0446 *** 0.1051 1.111 0.0245 *** 
Asian Indian % 0.0047 1.005 0.0229  0.0458 1.047 0.0394  0.0506 1.052 0.0315  
Asian Pakistani % 0.0162 1.016 0.0167  -0.0198 0.980 0.0319  -0.0087 0.991 0.0201  
Asian Bangladeshi % 0.0117 1.012 0.0167  -0.0079 0.992 0.0285  -0.0112 0.989 0.0213  
Black African/ Caribbean/Other % 0.0060 1.006 0.0200  -0.0366 0.964 0.0479  0.0218 1.022 0.0327  
LA Level             
LA IMD Score 0.3453 1.412 0.1623 * 0.0565 1.058 0.1663  0.2723 1.313 0.0660 *** 
JSA 5 Year Average % -0.1065 0.899 0.1551  0.0732 1.076 0.1785  -0.1146 0.892 0.0678  
Infant mortality per 1,000 0.0857 1.089 0.0372 * -0.0012 0.999 0.0570  0.0403 1.041 0.0209  
Level 4 Qualification % -0.0794 0.924 0.0835  0.0553 1.057 0.0913  -0.1329 0.876 0.0274 *** 
Gini coefficient -0.1024 0.903 0.0958  0.0832 1.087 0.1432  0.0627 1.065 0.0391  
Cross-level interactions             
LA IMD * LSOA IMD -0.0752 0.928 0.0320 * -0.0584 0.943 0.0370  -0.1313 0.877 0.0389 *** 
Gini * LSOA IMD 0.1183 1.126 0.0321 *** 0.1661 1.181 0.0375 *** 0.1683 1.183 0.0383 *** 
             
Intercept 5.4952 243.516 0.0495 *** 3.4500 31.499 0.2584 *** 3.6940 40.204 0.0221 *** 
             
N LSOA 2707    4115    4115    
N MSOA (LA) 543(13)    837(18)    837(18)    
             
Random effects s² s y0 yf nl() s² s y0 yf nl() s² s y0 yf nl() 
MSOA 0.1269 0.3562    0.2355 0.4853    0.1526 0.3907    
LA ~0 ~0    ~0 ~0    ~0 ~0    
LA – Mixed Heritage % 0.0509 0.2256    0.1336 0.3655    0.0005 0.0235    
LA – Asian Indian % 0.0565 0.2376    0.1102 0.3319    0.0912 0.3020    
LA – Asian Pakistani % 0.0286 0.1691    0.0659 0.2568    0.0001 0.0104    
LA – Asian Bangladeshi % 0.0389 0.1973    0.0655 0.2560    0.0437 0.2090    
LA – Black A/C/O % 0.0422 0.2055    0.1485 0.3854    0.0830 0.2881    
LA – LSOA IMD Score 0.0741 0.2722    0.0315 0.1775    0.0866 0.2943    
Spatial covariance (exp) 0.3065 0.5536 0.99 0.01 -9.2 0.4348 0.6594 1 <.01 -12.4 0.2998 0.5476 † † † 
              




Table 3 shows the results from the final multilevel spatial models. We describe the key 
findings related to the social gradient - the relationship between area-level deprivation and 
child welfare interventions – and the inverse intervention and inequality intervention laws 
below. Most of the control variables were not found to be statistically significant, with the 
exception of infant mortality rates (in the CIN model) and the proportion of the population 
with higher education qualifications (NVQ level 4 or higher) within the LA in the CLA model. 
A 7.3 per cent increase in the proportion of the LA population with NVQ4 or higher 
qualifications was associated with around 12.5 per cent lower rates of children looked after, 
holding all else constant. This raises some important questions regarding the role of cultural 
capital in relation to care proceedings (Houston, 2002; Dillon, 2019), that we are unable to 
fully explore in this paper. 
 
The Social Gradient: Neighbourhood Deprivation and Intervention Rates 
LSOA-level deprivation score was the single strongest predictor of intervention rates across 
all three levels of intervention. In all three types of intervention, LSOA-level deprivation was 
statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. As LSOA-level deprivation increases, the 
rates of Children in Need, children on Child Protection Plans, and Children Looked After all 
increase. The relationship between deprivation and intervention was strongest when 
looking at Child Protection Plans (B = 0.5542) and Children Looked After (B = 0.5293) and 
weakest in relation to Children in Need (B = 0.4392). However, all three coefficients 
represent large changes in the rates of intervention. 
 
The strength of this relationship can be described using exponentiated coefficients, which 
represent the expected multiplicative change in the rates of intervention for an increase of 
one standard deviation in indices of multiple deprivation score (for example, whether the 
expected rate would double, triple, or halve). As mentioned, a one standard deviation 
increase in deprivation is associated with an additional 10 per cent of the population in the 
neighbourhood living in income deprivation (Table 2), as defined by being in receipt of 
income-related benefits and/or having an income less than 60 per cent of the median 
national income, as well as associated increases in health, employment, and other types of 
deprivation measured by the IMD. These multiplicative changes can be considered a single-
number indicator of the social gradient. 
 
An increase of one standard deviation in LSOA IMD score was associated with a 55 per cent 
increase in the expected Children in Need rate in the LSOA (eb = 1.551), a 74 per cent 
increase in the expected Child Protection Plan rate (eb = 1.741), and a 70 per cent increase 
in the expected Children Looked After rate (eb = 1.698). We would expect to see much 
higher levels of intervention in more deprived neighbourhoods than in less deprived 
neighbourhoods, holding all else equal. This means the social gradient is approximately this 
strong after controlling for other characteristics that may differ between neighbourhoods, 
such as differences in ethnic densities, local authority membership, different proximities to 
high or low intervention areas, different proportions of university educated residents in the 
population, and so on.  
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The social gradient is slightly stronger for CIN (B = 0.538, Appendix Table A1) and CLA (B = 
0.5576, Appendix Table A2) rates before controlling for other factors like population 
education and ethnic population, demonstrating the importance of analysing the 
relationship between deprivation and child welfare interventions using a sufficiently 
complex statistical approach. These results demonstrate that more descriptive findings from 
earlier research showing the relationship between deprivation and child welfare 
interventions (Bywaters, et al., 2014a; 2014b; 2015; 2018a; 2018b) stand up under higher 
levels of statistical scrutiny.  
 
Inverse Intervention and Inequality Intervention 
We find evidence for the inverse intervention law and for a newly hypothesized ‘inequality 
intervention law’, with some provisos that warrant further investigation with better data. 
Before considering these limitations, we present the results under their conceptualisation in 
previous research (Bywaters, et al. 2018a). We urge readers to carefully read the limitations 
of this approach to defining the inverse intervention law in the section below. 
 
The inverse intervention law is parameterised as an interaction effect between LA-level IMD 
score and LSOA-level IMD score. The inequality intervention law is parameterised as an 
interaction between LA-level Gini coefficient and LSOA level IMD score. One standard 
deviation changes in LA-level IMD score and LA-level Gini coefficient are used as reference 
points for low, average, and high levels of LA deprivation and income inequality, as they are 
roughly equivalent to the average local authority in the bottom, middle, and top tertile of all 
local authorities respectively. The means and standard deviation values for these variables 
are shown in table one. For example, our reference point for a high deprivation LA IMD 
score is 22 (the mean) plus 8.14 (one standard deviation). An LA with this level of 
deprivation would be in the most deprived third of local authorities, whereas an LA with an 
overall level of deprivation one standard deviation below the mean would be in the least 
deprived third of all LAs. The interpretation of the IIL parts of the model is therefore “how 
much does the social gradient change in different local authority contexts, such as in an 
overall more deprived or more unequal local authorities respectively”. 
 
The inverse intervention law was statistically significant for both Children in Need rates and 
Children Looked After rates, but not for Child Protection Plan rates. The inequality 
intervention law was statistically significant for all forms of intervention. The overall change 
in the size of the social gradient conditional on local authority level deprivation and income 
inequality was quite substantial in most cases, even when only looking at one standard 
deviation changes in income inequality and overall deprivation. Examples of social gradients 
for different levels of LA income inequality and overall deprivation, and different 
combinations of these contexts, are presented in table four. 
 
In a high deprivation local authority, the social gradient for CIN rates was roughly 44 per 
cent, meaning that an increase of one standard deviation in neighbourhood deprivation was 
associated with a 44 per cent increase in CIN rate. In a low deprivation local authority an 
equivalent increase in neighbourhood level deprivation would be associated with a 67.2 per 
cent increase in the neighbourhood CIN rate. For CLA rates the change in the social gradient 
was more pronounced for different LA contexts. High deprivation local authorities had social 
gradients of 49 per cent and low deprivation local authorities had social gradients of 94 per 
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cent. In other words, equivalent changes in neighbourhood deprivation were associated 
with almost doubled CLA rates in low deprivation authorities but only a 1.5 times increase in 
high deprivation authorities. 
 
In local authorities with high income inequality an increase of one standard deviation in 
neighbourhood deprivation was associated with a 75 per cent increase in CIN rate, a 106 per 
cent increase in CPP rates, and a 101 per cent increase in CLA rate. By contrast, local 
authorities with low income inequality had much weaker associations between 
neighbourhood deprivation and interventions. Increases in neighbourhood deprivation in 
low income inequality authorities were associated with a 37.8 per cent increase in CIN rates, 
a 47.5 per cent increase in CPP rates, and a 43.5 per cent increase in CLA rates.  
 
Higher local authority level deprivation and lower income inequality was associated with 
weaker associations between neighbourhood deprivation and intervention rates. This 
suggests that poverty may be less of a determining factor in state intervention in authorities 
that are more equal and where deprivation is more visible. Furthermore, combinations of 
different LA contexts show that in cases where deprivation is high and income inequality is 
low, we would expect the social gradient to be as low as 26 to 40 per cent depending on the 
type of intervention. In the opposite context, where deprivation is low and income 
inequality is high, we would expect social gradients between 88 per cent and 129 per cent. 
Local authority context appears to substantially change the relationship between 
deprivation and child welfare interventions, and in some comparisons, this is quite 
pronounced. At the extremes, we would expect a low deprivation, high income inequality 
local authority to have a social gradient around five times stronger (129 per cent increase) 
than the social gradient in a high deprivation, low income inequality local authority (25.8 per 
cent increase). 
 
Table 4. How increases in intervention associated with one standard deviation changes in neighbourhood 
deprivation (the social gradient) change in different LA contexts (multiplicative social gradient) 
     
 LA-Level Context 




CIN Social Gradient 1.672 1.438 1.378 1.746 
CPP Social Gradient 1.846* 1.642* 1.475 2.056 
CLA Social Gradient 1.936 1.489 1.435 2.009 
     
 LA-Level Combined Contexts 
LA IMD High Deprivation Low Deprivation High Deprivation Low Deprivation 








CIN Social Gradient 1.619 1.882 1.278 1.486 
CPP Social Gradient 1.939 2.179 1.391 1.563 
CLA Social Gradient 1.762 2.291 1.258 1.636 
     
* = Not Statistically Significant 
     
 
We also direct readers to the appendices to show an additional point in relation to the 
identification of the two ‘IIL’s. The inverse intervention law is not a statistically significant 
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interaction effect unless the inequality intervention law is also included in the model 
(Appendix Tables A1 – A3). This is due to the fact that both laws operate in opposition to 
one another. More deprived areas typically have a more pronounced gap between the low 
income population and the middle-income population, creating a somewhat paradoxical 
situation where greater local equality is usually the result of a smaller gap between the 
middle-earning subset of the population and the low-earning subset.  
 
This is at odds with our usual understanding of national or international inequality as being 
largely determined by the excessive wealth of very few people at the top of the income 
distribution. These types of earners tend not to be resident in the most deprived regions at 
a local level, and hence do not feature in the calculation of local inequality. In this sense, 
greater local income equality can be found when either the majority of the population is on 
a low income or when the entire population has incomes more closely distributed around 
the middle of the income distribution, usually in London boroughs where cost of living is 
most expensive. Inequality is usually associated with a large divide between the average 
income of low-income households and the average income of middle-income households. 
Although contrary to our intuition, this pattern is consistent with other researchers’ 
estimates of local-area inequality in England (Bradshaw & Bloor, 2016). This may imply that 
the economic capital of social workers in more equal local authorities is likely to be closer to 
that of service users than it would be in more unequal local authorities, possibly leading to a 
greater convergence of lived experience. 
 
Limitations 
This represents close to the limits of complex quantitative analysis that can be done with a 
reanalysis of the Child Welfare Inequalities Project administrative data. As identified earlier, 
a primary weakness is the absence of individual level demographic or socio-economic data 
about parents, as this is not captured by services. In addition, even if these data were 
captured, the absence of linked data for children not known to children’s services means 
that individual-level statistical models are an impossibility at this time (even linking to a 
more universal resource such as the National Pupil Database would exclude many children 
[Emmot et al., 2019]). This means that we cannot confidently make statements about 
individual socioeconomic circumstances and how they relate to child welfare interventions. 
A full analysis of individual children’s likelihoods of intervention conditional on their family 
socioeconomic circumstances is essential for a complete understanding of the relationship 
between deprivation and child welfare interventions. At this stage we can only reliably talk 
about patterns related to neighbourhoods and what this might mean for social work while 
urging further developments in data linkage.  
 
Secondly, it should be stated explicitly that child welfare interventions are not purely 
punitive outcomes. Being classified as ‘In Need’ is a prerequisite condition to accessing 
support from services, which may well be welcomed by families. Further, local authorities 
have a statutory duty to protect children from living in abusive or neglectful circumstances. 
However, we question whether circumstances resulting in some types of more coercive 
intervention, like children being taken into care, might have been better and more justly 
avoided if possible underlying conditions like poverty were addressed on a structural level. 
Again, this requires better data and further research that explores the relationship between 
preceding socioeconomic circumstances and subsequent interventions in relation to the 
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reasons for intervention. Our intention is to continue to draw attention to the social 
determinants of child welfare interventions in a similar way to how authors have drawn 
attention to the social determinants of health (Wilkinson & Marmot, 2003; Bywaters, 2020). 
 
The use of LSOA-level IMD scores may introduce potential errors in the specification of the 
inverse intervention law. It is not ideal, in a technical sense, for us to rely on the use of a 
higher-level aggregate of a lower-level variable, even after centering variables 
appropriately, as this introduces a risk of multicollinearity. This is another reason why 
individual-level socioeconomic data are necessary to strengthen evidence of the inverse 
intervention law. 
 
Lastly, it is necessary to state that the experimental method used to derive local authority 
income inequality coefficient estimates will require future validation. While this method 
relies on simulations from very detailed summary data in local authorities that effectively 
adjusts for skew, there are ongoing debates around whether income inequality at the local 
level is a meaningful concept and the implementation of inequality measures for local areas 
in the UK is somewhat underdeveloped (Bradshaw & Bloor, 2016; Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2006). This research has, however, used the most advanced possible approach to estimating 
Gini coefficients which leverages specialist commercial survey data. If nothing else, the 
findings here demonstrate that local area inequality may have profound effects on social 
work intervention and this alone should warrant greater methodological developments in 
the measurement of income inequality in the UK. 
 
Conclusions 
We find a strong and statistically significant relationship between levels of deprivation and 
rates of child welfare interventions in LSOAs while holding ethnic demographics, 
unemployment levels, infant mortality rates, population higher education rates, spatial 
correlations, and local authority inequality constant. Higher deprivation is associated with 
higher rates of children in need, children on a child protection plans, and children looked 
after. However, this relationship appears to differ depending on contextual factors at the 
local authority level. In local authorities with low deprivation overall and high-income 
inequality, the relationship between neighbourhood deprivation scores and intervention 
rates is much stronger than it is in local authorities with high overall deprivation and low 
income inequality.  
 
The quantitative evidence presented here supports the findings that emerged from the 
earlier descriptive work by Bywaters and others (2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2018a; 2018b; Morris, 
et al., 2018), from which evidence of the social gradient in child protection interventions 
and the inverse intervention law in England emerged. This provides the much needed 
statistical scrutiny to carry child welfare inequalities arguments onwards into policy. The 
social gradient appears to be robust after controlling for theoretically confounding 
relationships and differs substantially depending on local authority socioeconomic contexts. 
It is important to state here that to fully understand ethnic inequalities a more complex 
methodology is needed, which we aim to present in a related paper. Here, we have only 
controlled for a possible confounding relationship between IMD scores and ethnic density 
and have not examined differences between ethnic populations.  
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Variations in the social gradient in child welfare interventions are far more complicated than 
they first appear. Socioeconomic relationships are subject to at least two moderating LA-
level factors that often suppress one another. We have named them the ‘inverse 
intervention law’ and the ‘income inequality intervention law’, in keeping with health 
inequalities nomenclature (Tudor Hart, 1971). The new identification of the ‘income 
inequality intervention law’ may explain why international replications of the Child Welfare 
Inequalities Project have, to date, found limited evidence for the ‘inverse intervention law’ 
(Keddell, et al., 2019).  
 
With regards to variations in intervention rates, the evidence about the social gradient 
demonstrates that these are not the result of a ‘postcode lottery’. Far from it. Contextual 
effects of income inequality and overall deprivation are consistent determinants of 
socioeconomic inequalities in intervention rates.  In particular, income inequality 
exacerbates existing socioeconomic inequalities, mirroring the kind of relationship identified 
by Eckenrode, et al. (2014) and demonstrating the need for child protection to be included 
in wider discussions about inequality and social problems. This is just one part of a growing 
body of evidence that highlights the way that the ordering of many parts of children’s 
services provision is associated with socioeconomic status including, for example, the 
funding of and recent cuts to children and young peoples’ services (Webb & Bywaters, 2018; 
Hood, et al., 2016; Devaney, 2018; Jones, 2018).  
 
Research, policy and practice that addresses the structural inequalities between poorer and 
more affluent children, families, neighbourhoods, and local authorities should therefore be 
central in efforts to ensure that all children have an equal chance of a good enough 
childhood. The way that contextual factors at different geographies shape socioeconomic 
inequalities in children’s social care is too great to be ignored. We estimate that a local 
authority in the bottom tertile of deprivation and the top tertile of inequality will have a 
social gradient around five times steeper than a local authority in the top tertile of 
deprivation and the bottom tertile of income inequality. The findings presented here 
demonstrate that the relationship at a structural level between child welfare interventions 
and deprivation is both substantial and significant, a relationship that cannot be disregarded 
as one that simply reflects demographic differences. Although such demographic 
differences undoubtedly play a role, a very large piece of the puzzle in explaining variations 
in intervention rates can be explained by socioeconomic structures.  
 
Of course, socioeconomic and demographic factors associated with child welfare 
interventions are only one part of the social work landscape. Leadership and practice 
culture undoubtedly play a part in variation between areas. In the 1960s, Packman’s (1968) 
research noted the important role of departments’ policies, practices and philosophies in 
explaining variation in intervention rates. Under the current UK regime, Wijedasa, Warner 
and Scourfield (2018) found that as well as changing low-income rates in English local 
authorities, Ofsted judgements and participation in the Innovation Programme were also 
correlated with change over time in rates of children looked after.  
 
Social ‘determinants’ are not considerations in opposition to other dimensions in this 
complex landscape, but are essential, pervasive underlying factors which have received too 
little attention. Inequity on the basis of socioeconomic background is an undesirable feature 
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of a just child protection system. If the social work profession believes that a family’s 
socioeconomic background should not prejudice their chances of having their children taken 
into care the answer is not to ignore these very large socioeconomic inequalities. Rather, 
these inequalities need to be engaged with. While socioeconomic discrimination may have 
no place in individual social workers’ ethos and practice, it appears to creep into the 
patterning of interventions and is linked to wider societal structures and systems. As with 
health inequalities, child welfare inequalities require a multi-level response; changing social 
work practice, culture or leadership styles is best done alongside changing underlying 
structural contexts.  
 
We may not know yet precisely how much income inequality or geographic poverty needs 
to change to remove the socioeconomic inequalities in child welfare interventions, nor do 
we have a sufficient understanding of the mechanisms that lead from poverty to risk of or 
substantiated child abuse and neglect and subsequent removal (although this body of 
evidence is slowly growing; Cooper & Stewart, 2013, 2017; Mason & Bywaters, 2016). 
However, we do know in which direction we need to move on a structural level to reduce 
interventions and socioeconomic child welfare inequalities. Interventions are lower in 
neighbourhoods with lower deprivation, no matter their demographic makeup or proximity 
to other low-intervention areas. Poor neighbourhoods seem to stand out more as sites for 
intervention in local authorities where deprivation is more uncommon. High income 
inequality is associated with greater disparities in intervention rates between 
neighbourhoods. The evidence suggests that reducing deprivation may be a very effective 
way to reduce the rates of children being taken into care, and that reducing income 
inequality would result in less pronounced socioeconomic inequalities in intervention rates. 
The policy implications of more deprived local authorities having less steep social gradients 
is quite not as intuitive, and comparative research is ongoing, but this may be the result of 
historically higher levels of spending on early help services in more deprived local 
authorities (Webb & Bywaters, 2018) and the needs and community strengths in more 
deprived areas. 
 
Inequalities in children’s chances of receiving a child welfare intervention are a product of 
both demand factors affecting their likelihood of a good enough family life and supply 
factors which affect the choices local authorities’ make about how, when and where to 
intervene (Bywaters et al., 2015). For both demand and supply, key influences are structural 
and systemic rather than individual or random. The extent to which a local authority 
reinforces or reduces structural inequalities in children’s life chances is strongly linked to the 
contexts created by national policies and their legacy, affecting both local resources and 
how the role of children’s services is conceptualised and judged. This evidence suggests that 
the current context is resulting in a strong reinforcement of socioeconomic inequalities at 
the local level.  
 
Families need sufficient individual and communal resources to eliminate the socioeconomic 
factors associated with risk, and we must be aware of the systemic conditions that may lead 
to institutions knowingly or unknowingly placing their poorest neighbourhoods under 
inequitable levels of scrutiny. This is an especially important consideration for policy. If 
national and local responses to high and rising levels of state intervention in family life are 
to promote greater equity in children’s life chances they must address the impact of 
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underlying socio-economic structures on families and on communities. Child protection 
strategies which fail to respond to social and economic inequalities and the contexts that 
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Table A1: Multilevel Negative Binomial Model predicting Children in Need rates per 10,000 Children (standardised independent variables)   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
LSOA Level B p B p B p B p B P 
LSOA IMD Score   0.5380 *** 0.5278 *** 0.5125 *** 0.4392 *** 
Mixed Heritage %     0.0377 * 0.0389 * 0.0276  
Asian Indian %     -0.0025  0.0007  0.0047  
Asian Pakistani %     0.0179  0.0193  0.0162  
Asian Bangladeshi %     0.0016  0.0015  0.0117  
Black African/ Caribbean/Other %     -0.0032  -0.0091  0.0060  
LA Level           
LA IMD Score     0.1965  0.2280 . 0.3453 * 
JSA 5 Year Average %     0.0192  0.0304  -0.1065  
Infant mortality per 1,000     0.0491  0.0394  0.0857 * 
Level 4 Qualification %     0.0167  -0.0222  -0.0794  
Gini coefficient       -0.0763  -0.1024  
Cross-level interactions           
LA IMD * LSOA IMD     0.0049  -0.0927 *** -0.0752 * 
Gini * LSOA IMD       0.1342 *** 0.1183 *** 
           
Intercept 5.5576 *** 5.4930 *** 5.4439 *** 5.4552 *** 5.4952 *** 
           
Random effects s² s s² s s² s s² s s² s 
MSOA 0.2676 0.5173 0.0556 0.2358 0.0479 0.2189 0.0479 0.2188 0.1269 0.3562 
LA 0.0799 0.2828 0.0834 0.2888 0.0259 0.1610 0.0244 0.1563 ~0 ~0 
LA – Mixed Heritage %     0.0009 0.0296 0.0007 0.0268 0.0509 0.2256 
LA – Asian Indian %     0.0019 0.0433 0.0019 0.0433 0.0565 0.2376 
LA – Asian Pakistani %     0.0006 0.0239 0.0005 0.0231 0.0286 0.1691 
LA – Asian Bangladeshi %     0.0005 0.0222 0.0006 0.0239 0.0389 0.1973 
LA – Black A/C/O %     0.0007 0.0271 0.0011 0.0334 0.0422 0.2055 
LA – LSOA IMD Score   0.0128 0.1129 0.0129 0.1137 0.0019 0.0432 0.0741 0.2722 
Spatial correlation (exp)         0.3065 0.5536 
           




Table A2: Multilevel Negative Binomial Model predicting Child Protection Plans per 10,000 Children (standardised independent variables)   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
LSOA Level B p B p B p B p B p 
LSOA IMD Score   0.5576 *** 0.5670 *** 0.5609 *** 0.5542 *** 
Mixed Heritage %     0.0643  0.0640  0.0723 *** 
Asian Indian %     0.0433  0.0439  0.0458  
Asian Pakistani %     0.0251  -0.0221  -0.0198  
Asian Bangladeshi %     0.0110  -0.0093  -0.0079  
Black African/ Caribbean/Other %     0.0389  -0.0359  -0.0366  
LA Level           
LA IMD Score     0.1231  0.0886  0.0565  
JSA 5 Year Average %     0.0047  -0.0316  0.0732  
Infant mortality per 1,000     -0.0358  -0.0086  -0.0012  
Level 4 Qualification %     -0.1090  -0.0409  0.0553  
Gini coefficient       0.1198  0.0832  
Cross-level interactions           
LA IMD * LSOA IMD     0.0527  -0.0664 . -0.0584  
Gini * LSOA IMD       0.1673 *** 0.1661 *** 
           
Intercept 3.8212 *** 3.4321 *** 3.4083 *** 3.4076 *** 3.4500 *** 
           
Random effects s² s s² s s² s s² s s² s 
MSOA 0.3159 0.5620 0.0950 0.3082 0.0711 0.2666 0.0068 0.0261 0.2355 0.4853 
LA 0.1047 0.3236 0.0926 0.3043 0.0502 0.2241 0.0039 0.0197 ~0 ~0 
LA – Mixed Heritage %     0.0202 0.1420 0.0017 0.0130 0.1336 0.3655 
LA – Asian Indian %     0.0086 0.0927 0.0011 0.0106 0.1102 0.3319 
LA – Asian Pakistani %     0.0050 0.0705 0.0004 0.0064 0.0659 0.2568 
LA – Asian Bangladeshi %     0.0033 0.0571 0.0003 0.0056 0.0655 0.2560 
LA – Black A/C/O %     0.0234 0.1529 0.0020 0.0141 0.1485 0.3854 
LA – LSOA IMD Score   0.0250 0.1580 0.0147 0.1212 1.016e-09 3.187e-05 0.0315 0.1775 
Spatial correlation (exp)         0.4348 0.6594 
           





Table A3: Multilevel Negative Binomial Model predicting Children Looked After per 10,000 Children (standardised independent variables)   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
LSOA Level B p B p B p B p B p 
LSOA IMD Score   0.5576 *** 0.5085 *** 0.5098 *** 0.5293 *** 
Mixed Heritage %     0.1019 *** 0.1010 *** 0.1051 *** 
Asian Indian %     0.0454  0.0480  0.0506  
Asian Pakistani %     -0.0057  -0.0045  -0.0087  
Asian Bangladeshi %     -0.0123  -0.0096  -0.0112  
Black African/ Caribbean/Other %     0.0193  0.0160  0.0218  
LA Level           
LA IMD Score     0.2854 *** 0.2529 *** 0.2723 *** 
JSA 5 Year Average %     -0.0966  -0.0968  -0.1146  
Infant mortality per 1,000     0.0311  0.0358 . 0.0403  
Level 4 Qualification %     -0.1639  -0.1320  -0.1329 *** 
Gini coefficient       0.0601  0.0627  
Cross-level interactions           
LA IMD * LSOA IMD     -0.0019  -0.1202 *** -0.1313 *** 
Gini * LSOA IMD       0.1629 *** 0.1683 *** 
           
Intercept 3.8212 *** 3.4321 *** 3.6829 *** 3.6842 *** 3.6940 *** 
           
Random effects s² s s² s s² s s² s s² s 
MSOA 0.3159 0.5620 0.0950 0.3082 0.0035 0.0186 0.0032 0.0180 0.1526 0.3907 
LA 0.1047 0.3236 0.0926 0.3043 7.335e-10 2.708e-05 1.466e-10 1.211e-05 ~0 ~0 
LA – Mixed Heritage %     7.257e-10 2.694e-05 4.724e-10 2.174e-05 0.0005 0.0235 
LA – Asian Indian %     6.702e-03 0.0082 7.247e-03 0.0085 0.0912 0.3020 
LA – Asian Pakistani %     4.240e-10 2.059e-05 5.386e-10 2.321e-05 0.0001 0.0104 
LA – Asian Bangladeshi %     1.530e-03 0.0039 2.082e-03 0.0046 0.0437 0.2090 
LA – Black A/C/O %     4.736e-03 0.0069 4.918e-03 0.0070 0.0830 0.2881 
LA – LSOA IMD Score   0.0250 0.1580 0.0024 0.0155 0.0004 0.0062 0.0866 0.2943 
Spatial correlation (exp)         0.2998 0.5476 
           




Table A4. Spatial correlations for child welfare interventions in LSOAs (distance 
between LSOA population weighted centroids)  
 
Distance between LSOAs 




Less than 10km 0.631 0.979 <0.001 
Between 10km and 50km 0.098 0.889 <0.001 
Between 50km and 100km 0.002 0.721 <0.001 
Greater than 100km <0.001 0.363 <0.001 
 
